In this paper we consider a model of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information with ambiguity-averse agents. Individuals fail to estimate accurately their own accident probabilities and make their decisions based on intervals of possible probabilities. The interaction between asymmetric information and ambiguity aversion gives rise to some interesting results. First, if the low-risk insurees are sufficiently more ambiguity averse than high-risk insurees, there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where both types of insurees buy full insurance. Second, if the lower bound of the low risks' accident probability, is higher than that of the high risks, there exist separating equilibria involving overinsurance. Third, the low risks' equilibrium contract is closer to their first-best one than under standard expected utility. Due to the endogeneity of commitment to the contracts offered by insurers, our model has always an equilibrium which is unique and interim incentive efficient (second-best).
Introduction
Most theoretical models of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information typically assume that individuals' preferences admit the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. The classical model rules out the situation where insurees are uncertain about the likelihood of a state of the world occurring and cannot assess precisely their own probability of events. This assumption might be too restrictive in reality. Individuals, contrary to insurance companies, may not have perfect confidence on the perceived probability measure simply due to the lack of experience or data in their disposal. With imprecise information, individuals may consider several probability measures without knowing which of these measures is the correct one. This ambiguity in underlying probabilities is referred to as Knightian uncertainty (often also called ambiguity), defined by Knight (1921) . In this paper we introduce Knightian uncertainty in a competitive insurance model with asymmetric information and study the effects of the interaction between asymmetric information and aversion to ambiguity on the equilibrium allocations.
There is a large body of experimental literature documenting ambiguity-averse preferences among individuals. Ellsberg (1961) was the first to demonstrate the failure of the expected-utility model to explain individual behavior in the face of uncertainty. Camerer and Weber (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of further experimental studies in this direction. A decision criterion which is compatible with this pattern of preferences is the maxmin (or multiple-prior) expected utility. Under the maxmin expected utility, an individual has a set of probability beliefs (priors) instead of a single one, and evaluates an action according to the minimum expected utility over this set of priors. Such a behavior is often referred to as ambiguity aversion, for it indicates the dislike of uncertainty with unknown or ambiguous odds. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have provided axiomatic foundations for the maxmin expected utility.
Based on the theoretical framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , several authors have studied the effects of Knightian uncertainty in financial markets over the last two decades. Dow and Werlang (1992) , Cao, Wang and Zhang (2005) , Easley and O'Hara (2009) showed that ambiguity aversion may lead to limited participation in trading in asset market equilibrium. Mukerji and Tallon (2003) demonstrated that ambiguity aversion may have adverse effects on risk sharing in asset markets. Epstein and Chen (2001) , Epstein and Wang (2004) , Epstein and Schneider (2008) , Dana and Riedel (2010) studied asset prices in markets with ambiguous information signals, but without information transmission. In a game-theoretic literature, incomplete information games under ambiguity have been studied by Lo (1998) , Salo and Weber (1995) , Epstein and Wang (1996) , Kajii and Ui (2005) among others.
Although the effects of Knightian uncertainty on its own have been studied extensively, the effects of the interaction between ambiguity aversion and asymmetric information are relatively unexplored. Tallon (1998) illustrates how ambiguity aversion helps to resolve Grossman-Stiglitz paradox and demonstrates that an agent facing Knightian uncertainty might be willing to pay to acquire information which is already contained in the equilibrium price. Also, Kajii and Ui (2009) and Martins-daRocha (2010) characterize weakly interim efficient allocations under uncertainty using the notion of compatible priors.
In this paper we consider a model of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information with ambiguity-averse agents.
1 Individuals fail to estimate accurately their own accident probabilities and make their decisions based on intervals of possible probabilities. They act according to the Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility and consider only the worst state that can occur to them when evaluating an allocation. More specifically, in the under-insurance region the worstcase for the insuree is when the true accident probability is the highest (the upper bound of the probability interval) while in the over-insurance region the worst-case is when the accident probability is the lowest (the lower bound of the probability interval).
In our analysis we employ the optimal mechanism introduced by Koufopoulos (2007) where insurers' commitment to the (menus of) contracts they offer is determined endogenously. That is, the contracts offered at Stage 1 are triples specifying: price, quantity and whether the insurer is committed to the contract (menu of contracts) or not. Because of the endogeneity of the commitment, the game has always a unique Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium even though we do not use any refinement to restrict beliefs off-the-equilibrium path. The application of this approach allows us to remedy both the non-existence problem in the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model and the multiplicity of equilibria issue arising in signalling models and in the three-stage game of Hellwig (1987) .
Furthermore, because insurers are allowed to offer menus of contracts, the equilibrium in our model is always interim incentive efficient (second-best).
Intuitively, the ability of the insurer to commit to a contract (or menu of contracts) makes the decision of the insurees of whether to take it independent of their beliefs about who else takes it. As a result, the insurer can profitably attract both types of insurees from any inefficient allocation and so such an allocation cannot be sustained as equilibrium. Finally, the ability of a firm to offer a menu of contracts without being committed to it acts a threat for a potential entrant and supports efficient allocations involving cross-subsidization across types of insurees as equilibria.
The introduction of ambiguity aversion into an asymmetric information framework allows us to derive several interesting results which cannot obtain in the standard expected-utility setting. First, if the low-risk insurees are sufficiently more ambiguity averse than high-risk insurees, there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where both types of insurees buy full insurance. The low risks' utility cost of under-or overinsurance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium.
Thus, the low risks prefer to purchase full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium than under-or overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium. This result cannot obtain in the standard expected-utility framework. If the insurees know accurately their accident probability, the utility cost of underinsurance will always be lower for the low risks. Hence, the low risks will always prefer underinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium. As a result, pooling cannot be an equilibrium and separation will always prevail.
2 Second, if the lower bound of the low risks' accident probability, is higher than that of the high risks, the utility cost of overinsurance can be lower for the low risks. In this case, the low risks prefer overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium. This is also driven by ambiguity aversion. If the insurees know accurately their accident probability, the utility cost of underinsurance (overinsurance) will always be lower (higher) for the low risks. Hence, the low risks 2 Unless, the degree of risk aversion of low risks is infinite (Leontief preferences).
will always prefer underinsurance to overinsurance and in the resulting separating equilibria they will always choose underinsurance.
3 Third, we show that under ambiguity aversion the equilibrium contract of the low risks is closer to their first-best one than under standard expected utility. In fact, ambiguity aversion relaxes the (binding) incentive compatibility constraint of high risks. As a result, the low-risk insurees buy more insurance (while still revealing their type) and move closer to their first-best allocation. All three results stem from the fact that in our framework the cost of separation depends not only on insurees degree of risk aversion (as in standard models, e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ) but also on their ambiguity aversion.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the mechanism we employ in this paper is optimal (the equilibrium is always interim incentive efficient). This implies that all three results discussed above are driven by ambiguity aversion and not by the suboptimality of the mechanism used for the allocation of resources or their interaction. This is another distinguishing feature of our model. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing papers in this literature is concerned with the optimality of the mechanism used. As a result, it is not clear which of the results are only driven by ambiguity aversion and which by the (possible) suboptimality of the mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model of competitive insurance market with asymmetric information where insurees face Knightian uncertainty about their own probabilities of accident. Section 3 provides an analysis of all possible equilibria in this model. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The Model
We consider the basic framework introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976 
be the fraction of the low risks in the economy.
In this environment, if an agent i knows precisely his own accident probability i p , then his expected utility is given by: 
More specifically, insurees' preferences admit the maxmin expected utility representation, so
That is, for each contract 
, which is equal to ( ) p p / 1 − when income in the two states is the same. Hence, the slope of the indifference curve ( )
has a kink on the 45-degree line.
There are (at least) two risk neutral insurance companies involved in Bertrand competition. Insurance companies cannot observe the type of insurees but they know
the proportion of the Hs and Ls in the population. They also know the utility function of insurees and the probability interval for each type of insurees. We assume that insurers are ambiguity neutral 5 . They use reference accident probabilities, one for each type, which, for simplicity, we assume that coincide with true probabilities i p .
6
The insurance contract ) , ( 2 1 α α = A specifies the premium 1 α and the coverage 2 α . As a result, the expected profit of an insurer offering contract
Definition of Efficiency
Following Holmström and Myerson (1983) , we say that allocation ( )
and the two incentive compatibility constraints
We have also analyzed the case insurers are ambiguity averse and most of the results are qualitatively similar. However, there two main differences: First, if insurers are ambiguity averse, everything else given, they charge a higher per-unit price which reflects the ambiguity premium. Second, if the insurers' degree of ambiguity aversion is sufficiently higher than that of insurees, the insurees are not willing to pay the high ambiguity premium the insurers charge and the insurance market collapses (no trade). 6 Our results would be qualitatively similar if the reference probabilities are different from the true ones. However, if the reference accident probabilities are lower than the true ones, the insurance companies should have some initial capital to fulfil their promises (cover their losses).
Equilibrium Game Structure
Insurance companies and insurees play the following three-stage screening game:
Stage 1: At least the two insurance companies simultaneously make offers of menus of contracts. Each menu may contain one or two contracts. 7 The insurers also specify which of the menus they offer they are committed to and which not.
Stage 2: Insurees apply for (at most) one of the menus offered from one insurance company. If an insuree's most preferred menu is offered by more than one insurance company, he takes each insurer's menu with equal probability.
Stage 3: After observing the menus offered by their rivals and those chosen by the insurees, the insurers decide whether to withdraw or not the menus which they did not commit to at Stage 1. If a menu is withdrawn, the insurees who have chosen it go to their endowment.
We only consider pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria. A set of menus is an equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
No menu in this set makes negative expected profits.
No other set of menus introduced alongside those already in the market would increase an insurer's expected profits.
We begin by examining how different assumptions about the degree of ambiguity aversion of the two types of insurees affect the relative slopes and shapes of their indifference curves. This is important because the relative slopes and shapes of the indifference curves determine the nature of the equilibrium (pooling or separating) and whether the separating equilibria involve under-or over-insurance. There are four cases to consider which are:
In cases (1) and (4) the indifference curves of the two types intersect twice (the single-crossing condition fails) whereas in Cases (2) and (3) 
In Case (2), the relative slopes of the indifference curves of the two types are similar to the standard expected framework. As a result, the equilibrium is qualitatively similar. However, ambiguity aversion relaxes the high risks' incentive compatibility constraint and allows the low risks to purchase more insurance compared to standard expected-utility case. That is, the equilibrium allocation under ambiguity aversion is closer to the first-best one.
We now derive some general results which will be very useful for establishing and characterizing the equilibria of our game. We first show that any equilibrium of our game must be interim incentive efficient (second-best). We then show that in any equilibrium allocation of our game the Hs choose full insurance. Finally, we show that any equilibrium allocation of our game maximizes the expected utility of the Ls given the no-mimicking and feasibility constraints as well as the constraint that the Hs' utility is at least as high as under full information about types of insurees.
Lemma 1: Any equilibrium allocation of our game must be interim incentive efficient.
Proof: Suppose that at Stage 1 of the game a firm offers an allocation (with or without commitment) which is not interim incentive efficient. This allocation lies below the (second-best) Pareto frontier. Thus, there exist incentive compatible and feasible allocations which make both types of insurees better-off and imply strictly positive profits for the firm(s) which will offer them. As a result, at Stage 1, a new entrant can offer an allocation with commitment which is incentive compatible, profitable, and is preferred by both types of insurees to the incumbent's offer. Because the new entrant is committed to his offer, both types of insurees will take it regardless of their beliefs about the choice of the other type. Therefore, the new entrant's offer will profitably attract both types and the incumbent's (inefficient) offer cannot be an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: In any equilibrium allocation of our game, at least, one of the two types of insurees buys full insurance.
Proof: Suppose that an insurer offers with or without commitment an incentive compatible and zero-profit allocation where, for example, both types are under-insured 
Lemma 3:
In any separating equilibrium of our game, the Hs take full insurance.
Proof: By Lemma 2, in any equilibrium allocation of our game, at least, one of the two types takes full insurances. Suppose that an insurer offers an efficient separating allocation with or without commitment where the Ls choose full insurance (for 8 A similar argument applies if one type chooses under-insurance and the other over-insurance or both types choose over-insurance.
. 
Lemma 4:
In any separating equilibrium of our game involving cross-subsidization across types, the Ls subsidize the Hs.
.
Proof: By Lemma 3, in any separating equilibrium the Hs choose full insurance. Also, because the Ls' accident probability is lower than that of the Hs, the Ls accept either under-or over-insurance in order to reveal their type and achieve a lower per-unit premium. Since the Ls are willing to bear the utility cost of under or over-insurance, they strictly prefer their contract to that chosen by the Hs. As a result, the incentive compatibility constraint of the Ls is not binding. Consider now an insurer offering an efficient separating allocation with the Hs' contract implying strictly positive profits for the insurer. Because the Ls' incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, a new entrant can profitably attract the Hs by offering them a welfare improving (but still profitable) allocation. Hence, there cannot exist a separating equilibrium where the Hs subsidize the Ls. Therefore, in any separating equilibrium involving crosssubsidization across types, the Ls subsidize the Hs. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5:
In any equilibrium allocation of our game involving cross-subsidization across types, the Ls' expected utility is maximized given the incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints. This implies that there exist incentive-compatible allocations which make the Ls strictly better-off and the insurer offering one of them can make strictly positive profits on the contract chosen by the Ls. Hence, at Stage 1, a new entrant can offer with commitment an incentive-compatible allocation which makes strictly better-off the Ls and strictly worse-off the Hs. Because the new entrant is committed to his offer and this offer makes the Ls better-off, at Stage 2, the Ls will choose the new entrant's offer regardless of the Hs' choice. If the incumbents' offer is with commitment the Hs will stay there, the incumbent is making losses and the deviant menu is clearly profitmaking. If the incumbents' offer is without commitment it will be withdrawn at Stage 3. Anticipating the withdrawal of the incumbent's offer, at Stage 2, the Hs will choose the new entrant's offer. Thus, being constrained only by incentive compatibility, the new entrant can make an offer implying strictly positive profits for him. Therefore, the incumbent's offer cannot be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6:
There can exist a separating equilibrium allocation where the insurers make zero profits on the contract offered to Ls and the contract offered to Hs even if the expected utility of the Ls is not maximized given incentive compatibility and feasibility.
Proof: Consider an interim incentive efficient separating allocation where the insurers make zero profits on the contract offered to Ls and the contract offered to Hs and the expected utility of the Ls is not maximized. An increase in the Ls' expected utility would require a deviation offering a loss-making contract to the Ls and a profit-making contract (for the insurer) to the Hs. The Ls would take the deviant contract but the Hs would not. Therefore, any deviation from the initial separating allocation would be loss-making.
Q.E.D.
Now that we have derived these general results, we can proceed to establish and characterize the equilibria of our game. Because the nature of the equilibrium (pooling or separating) and whether the separating equilibria involve under-or over-insurance depends on the parameters capturing the degree of ambiguity aversion of insurees, we consider four different cases.
Case 1:
The Ls' degree of ambiguity aversion is sufficiently higher than that of the Hs so that
Proposition 1: Suppose that the Ls' degree of ambiguity aversion is sufficiently higher than that of the Hs so that
. Then the pooling allocation * P A where both types buy full insurance is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium (see Figure   5 ).
Proof:
The indifference curves of the Ls are flatter than those of the Hs to the right of the 45-degree line because of the relation ( attract the Ls (or both types) and so * P A is an equilibrium. Also, by Lemma 2, in any equilibrium allocation at least one type buys full insurance and so in any pooling equilibrium both types buy full insurance. Hence, * P A is the unique pooling equilibrium (because any other full-insurance pooling allocation implies strictly negative or strictly positive profits for the insurers). Finally, because the Ls' indifference curve lies inside that of the Hs, a separating equilibrium cannot exist. Therefore, the pooling allocation * P A where both types buy full insurance is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Intuitively, ambiguity aversion increases the utility cost of under-or overinsurance. In particular, if the low-risk insurees are sufficiently more ambiguity averse than highrisk insurees, the utility cost of under-or overinsurance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. As a result, the low risks prefer to purchase full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit than under-or overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium. That is, the high degree of ambiguity aversion makes the cost of separation prohibitively high for the low risks. Two points should be made here: First, the pooling equilibrium with full insurance is due to ambiguity aversion and cannot obtain in the (2006)).
is violated then there cannot exist a "reasonable" pooling equilibrium (see Figure 6 ).
Proof: Any equilibrium allocation of our game: i) must be interim incentive efficient (by Lemma 1) and ii) requires that, at least, one of the two types buy full insurance (by Lemma 2). Thus, the only candidate for a pooling equilibrium is the pooling allocation involving full insurance for both types. However, if Intuitively, if the degree of ambiguity aversion of low-risk insurees is not sufficiently higher than that of high-risk insurees, the utility cost of under-or overinsurance is lower than the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. As a result, the low risks prefer under-or overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium.
Case 2:
In this case, the indifference curves of the two types of insurees intersect only once and the Ls indifference curve is steeper as in the standard expected-utility framework (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ). Not surprisingly, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Rothschild and Stiglitz. The key difference is that, because the ambiguity aversion relaxes the Hs' no-mimicking constraint, the Ls buy more insurance compared to the expected-utility framework. We also have to show that no other separating allocation can be equilibrium. By Lemma 4, the insurers cannot make strictly positive profits on the contract chosen by the Hs. Also, the incentive compatibility constraint of the Ls is not binding (the Ls strictly prefer their own contract to the Hs' contract). Competition, then, implies that no zero-profit contract but AA H A (full insurance) can be an equilibrium contract for the Hs. Given that, competition and incentive compatibility imply that the Ls will be A (see Figure 7) . 
Case 3:
In this case, the indifference curves of the two types of insurees intersect only once but, contrary to the standard expected-utility framework, the Ls' indifference curves are flatter. Thus, the resulting separating equilibrium involves the Ls taking overinsurance. This result, which is due to ambiguity aversion, is in sharp contrast with those of the expected-utility framework. Because the lower bound of the low risks' accident probability, L p , is higher than that of the high risks, H p , the utility cost of overinsurance is lower for the low risks. As a result, the insurers can separate the two types of insurees by offering contracts involving overinsurance. The low risks prefer overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium. In contrast, because the low risks' highest accident probability, L p , is greater than the corresponding probability of the high risks, H p , the utility cost of underinsurance is higher for the low risks. Hence, insurers cannot profitably attract the low risks by offering contracts involving less than full coverage (underinsurance). Therefore, in this case, there can exist separating equilibria involving overinsurance but not underinsurance. iii) The Hs buy full insurance whereas the Ls buy over-insurance (see Figure 11) .
Proof: Similar to Proposition 4.
Case 4:
In this case, the low risks' indifference curves are steeper in the under-insurance region and flatter in the over-insurance region (see Figure 12 ). Therefore, depending on the relative slopes of the indifference curves of the two types, there can exist separating equilibria involving either under-or overinsurance. In order to see this, consider the 
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal allocation in competitive insurance markets with private information. We derive a number of interesting results which are due to ambiguity aversion.
First, if the low-risk insurees are sufficiently more ambiguity averse than high-risk insurees, there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where both types of insurees buy full insurance. The low risks' utility cost of under-or overinsurance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. Thus, the low risks prefer to purchase full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium than under-or overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium.
Second, if the lower bound of the low risks' accident probability, is higher than that of the high risks, the utility cost of overinsurance can be lower for the low risks. In this case, the low risks prefer overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium. These two results cannot obtain in the standard expected-utility framework. If the insurees know accurately their accident probability, the utility cost of underinsurance (overinsurance) will always be lower (higher) for the low risks. Hence, the low risks will always prefer underinsurance to overinsuarance and underinsurance at a lower per-unit premium to full insurance at a high (pooling)
per-unit premium.
Third, we show that under ambiguity aversion the equilibrium contract of the low risks is closer to their first-best one than under standard expected utility. In fact, ambiguity aversion relaxes the (binding) incentive compatibility constraint of high risks. As a result, the low-risk insurees buy more insurance (while still revealing their type) and move closer to their first-best allocation.
Another distinguishing feature of our model is that the mechanism we employ in this paper is optimal (the equilibrium is always interim incentive efficient). This implies that all three results discussed above are driven by ambiguity aversion and not by the suboptimality of the mechanism used. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing papers in this literature considers the optimality of the mechanism employed and so it is not clear whether their results are only driven by ambiguity aversion or by the (possible) suboptimality of the mechanism.
Finally, although in this paper we have focused on insurance markets, the introduction of ambiguity aversion into an asymmetric information framework may have interesting implications for other issues as well. The design of managerial compensation schemes, the choice between self employment and being an employee, the design of financial contracts and other corporate finance issues are only some of them.
